Monday, April 7, 2008
Hume: Section II: Origin of Ideas
Hume states, “The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.” (Sec II.11) He explains that one can be in a “fit of anger” and recall a memory of being angry. However, being in a “fit of anger” is much more powerful than the recollection or thought of anger. The same goes for being in love. The passion of love is so powerful to the senses, however, when one thinks of another being in love the thought is inferior yet still conceived. Thus, Hume classifies perceptions of the mind as thoughts or ideas, those that are “less forcible and lively” and impressions, meaning “when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.” (Sec II.12) Hume further explains how when he have the idea or thought of a golden mountain we conceive gold and we conceive a mountain and thus, we can think of a golden mountain from past impressions. He states, “All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.” (Sec II.13) He makes two arguments to prove his point. He claims that when we rethink where our thoughts and ideas came from, they can be broken down into simple ideas “copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment.” (Sec II.14) He then goes into the idea of God, which he believes is as well from the mind increasing to no boundaries “goodness and wisdom.” (Sec II.14) His second argument is that if one were to be missing one of the senses, such as sight or hearing, then that individual would not be able to conceive colours or sound. And due to this, that individual would not come to certain ideas as others with those senses would. He goes further to say it also works for subjective manners, such that “a man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity.” (Sec II.15) However, after attempting to convince the reader that thoughts and ideas are copies of impressions, he stubbles upon a problem: the missing blue problem. As Professor Thompson explained in class, how can one explain a “missing shade of blue”, in a blue color scheme from light to dark, that one intuitively knows is there, however had no impression of this blue in the past? This is a big problem for the empiricist and Hume acknowledges it to be so. However, he dismisses it as “singular" and not part of any general pattern and thus, not worth worrying about.
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